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February 1968] Recent Developments 
INCOME TAX: CORPORATIONS-Incorporated 
Professional Service Organization Taxable 
as a Corporation; Kintner Regulations 
Held Invalid-Empey v. United States* 
779 
Lawrence G. Empey, a lawyer, was employed by the Drexler and 
Wald Professional Company, an association of attorneys that had 
incorporated in 1961 pursuant to the Colorado Corporation Code1 
and rule 265 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Empey be-
gan his employment with Drexler and Wald in March 1965, and in 
• 372 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 1967), government appeal authorized, 16 
P-H FED. TAXES at 61,002 (1968) (hereinafter cited as the principal case). 
l. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 31 (1963). 
2. CoLO. R. CIV. P. 265 (1963) provides in pertinent part: 
I. Lawyers may form professional service corporations for the practice of law 
under the Colorado Corporation Code. • • • The articles of incorporation of 
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November of the same year he acquired ten shares (ten per cent) of 
the outstanding capital stock of the corporation. On his 1965 federal 
income tax return, he reported income consisting of his salary as an 
employee of the company for ten months and ten per cent of the 
undistributed net income of the company for the two-month period 
in 1965 in which he had been a stockholder. After paying his taxes, 
Empey sued in federal district court for a refund of the taxes attrib-
utable to his share of the undistributed net income. The government 
maintained that under the tests of the Kintner regulations3 Drexler 
II. 
such corporations shall contain provisions complying with the following 
requirements: 
B. The corporation shall be organized solely for the purpose of conducting 
the practice of law only through persons qualified to practice law in the 
State of Colorado. 
C. The corporation may exercise the powers and privileges conferred upon 
corporations by the laws of Colorado only in furtherance of and subject 
to its corporate purpose. 
D. All shareholders of the corporation shall be persons duly licensed by the 
Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to practice law in the State of 
Colorado, and who at all times own their shares in their own right. 
They shall be individuals who ... are actively engaged in the practice of 
law in the offices of the corporation. 
E. Provisions shall be made requiring any shareholder who ceases to be eli-
gible to be a shareholder to dispose of all his shares forthwith either to 
the corporation or to any person having the qualifications described in 
paragraph D above. 
F .••• Lay directors and officers shall not exercise any authority whatsoever 
over professional matters. 
G. The articles of incorporation shall provide and all shareholders of the cor-
poration shall agree (a) ••• or (b) that all shareholders of the corporation 
shall be jointly and severally liable for all acts, errors and omissions of 
the employees of the corporation except during periods of time when the 
corporation shall maintain in good standing lawyers' professional liability 
insurance which shall meet the following minimum standards • • • • 
:B. The corporation shall do nothing which if done by an attorney employed 
by it would violate the standards of professional conduct established for 
such attorney by this Court. The corporation shall at all times comply 
with the standards of professional conduct established by this Court and 
the provisions of this Rule. Any violation of this Rule by the corporation 
shall be grounds to terminate or suspend its right to practice law. 
C. Nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to diminish or change the obligation 
of each attorney employed by the corporation to conduct his practice in 
accordance with the standards of professional conduct promulgated by this 
Court; any attorney who by act or omission causes the corporation to act 
or fail to act in a way which violates such standards of professional con-
duct shall be deemed personally responsible for such act or omission and 
shall be subject to discipline therefor. 
D. Nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to modify the attorney-client privi-
lege specified in C.R.S. 1963, 154-1-7(2) and any comparable common-law 
privilege. 
3. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965). Although technically the term "Kintner regu-
lations" has been used to refer to the regulations promulgated in 1960 in response 
to United States v. Kintner, which did not include the current subparagraph (h), the 
term "Kintner regulations," as used herein, shall refer to the amended Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.7701-2, with specific reference to subparagraph (h) on professional service orga-
nizations. For a detailed discussion of the history and the development of the regu-
lations which have defined "corporations" and "associations,'' see Scallen, Federal 
Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REv. 603, 
633-66 (1965). 
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and Wald was a partnership, rather than a corporation, for federal 
tax purposes, and therefore that Empey was not entitled to the 
refund.4 The United States District Court for Colorado held that 
Drexler and Wald was a corporation for federal tax purposes, and 
thus that Empey was entitled to a refund.I; The Kintner regulations 
are invalid, and, even if the regulations were valid, Drexler and 
·wald possessed all of the characteristics necessary for taxation as a 
corporation under the regulations.6 
The court's alternative holding that Drexler and Wald qualified 
as a corporation under the tests embodied in the Kintner regulations 
is open to question. When an organization is incorporated under 
state law, the regulations provide that it may qualify for taxation as 
4. If Drexler and '\Vald Professional Company is a "corporation" for federal tax 
purposes, any income retained by the corporation generally will not be taxed to the 
shareholders until distributed. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 11, 301. If, however, Drexler 
and Wald is a "partnership" for federal tax purposes, the entire earnings of the firm 
are taxed to each partner according to his respective share, whether or not some or 
all of the income is retained by the partnership. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 701-08. 
The importance of a determination that Drexler and Wald is a "corporation" is 
not limited to the taxation of retained earnings involved in the principal case; also 
at stake are the many tax benefits available to stockholders who are employees of 
their own corporation but unavailable to partners. The primary of these is the oppor-
tunity for "income splitting" through deferred compensation, pension plans, profit 
sharing, or stock options (INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 401-08, 421-25) which allows tax-
payers in high brackets to avoid the full impact of the progressive rate structure by 
spreading their income out over a period of years and/or realizing such income as 
capital gain at a maximum rate of twenty-five per cent. In addition, certain employee 
benefits are deductible by the business organization and/or are not taxable to the 
employees. Examples of such benefits are employee group-term life insurance, medical 
and hospital insurance and benefits, and meals and lodging. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§§ 79, 105-06, 119. 
5. Principal case at 854. 
6. Id. See also the recent case of O'Neill v. United States, 68 A.F.T.R.2d 405 (1968). 
In O'Neill an organization of doctors was classified as an "association" under the 
professional service association law of Ohio. The Ohio law incorporated by reference 
the entire corporation law of the state, except insofar as the corporation law was 
inconsistent with provisions of the professional service association law. The Ohio 
federal district court held that subparagraph (h) of the Kintner regulations is invalid 
because it discriminates unreasonably against professional service organizations, and 
that the association of doctors qualified for taxation as a corporation according to 
the tests embodied in subparagraphs (a) through (g), which the court found to be 
valid. For commentaries on the validity of the Kintner regulations and on the tax 
status of professional service organizations, see generally Anderson, Tax Aspects of 
Professional Corporations, 1963 S. CAL. TAX INST. 309; Bittker, Professional Associ-
ations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAX L. R.Ev. 
1 (1962); Kauffman &: Ledley, Some Comments on the Proposed Kintner Regulations, 
3 AM. Bus. L.J. 36 (1965); Mow, Professional Associations and Professional Corporations, 
16 Sw. L.J. 462 (1962); Ohl, Corporate Practice of Law in New York, 40 TAXES 263 
(1962); Pearson, The Professional Corporation, N.D.L. REv. 309 (1965); Scallen, Federal 
Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. R.Ev. 603 
(1965); Snyder &: Weck.stein, Quasi Corporations, Quasi Employees and Quasi Tax 
Relief for Professional Persons, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 613 (1963); Note, Professional Cor-
porations and Associations, 75 HARV. L. REv. 776 (1962); Comment, Wisconsin Profes-
sional Service Corporations Under the New "Kintner" Regulations, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 
564 (1966). 
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a corporation if it "more nearly resembles a corporation than a part-
nership or a trust."7 For the purposes of this test, the regulations 
spell out the following basic corporate characteristics which, taken 
together, distinguish a corporation from other types of organizations: 
"(i) [a]ssociates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the 
gains therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of manage-
ment, (v) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property, 
and (vi) free transferability of interests.''8 In addition, the regula-
tions leave open the possibility that in some cases other factors may 
be significant in classifying an organization as a corporation, a part-
nership, or a trust. 9 The regulations further note that in deciding 
whether an organization is a corporation or a partnership, the first 
two factors listed above are not relevant since they are generally 
common to both types of organization.10 The court in the principal 
case thus dealt only with the remaining four corporate characteristics 
and concluded that Drexler and Wald possessed all of them. It is 
submitted that the facts do not support such a clear-cut decision, 
and, indeed, that the company did not have at least two, and possibly 
three, of these corporate attributes. 
The regulations make special provision for the application of the 
above criteria to professional service organizations.11 For a profes-
sional service organization to have "continuity of life," the right to 
profits accompanying the ownership of a share in that organization 
must not be legally dependent upon the owner's participation in 
the organization as an employee; in other words, if an owner cannot 
7. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(l) (1960). It should be noted that the regulations 
are somewhat ambiguous. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(l) (1965) states that "a profes• 
sional service organization is treated as a corporation (or as an association and, there-
fore, taxable as a corporation) only if it has sufficient corporate characteristics to be 
classifiable as a corporation under paragraph (a) of this section, rather than as a part· 
nership or proprietorship." (Emphasis added.) Paragraph (a), however, includes two 
tests for determining the tax status of an organization. Subparagraph (a)(l) speaks in 
terms of a general resemblance test, whereby an organization will be treated as a 
corporation for tax purposes if it "more nearly resembles a corporation than a part-
nership or a trust." Subparagraph (a)(3) states that "an unincorporated organization 
shall not be classified as an association unless such organization has more corporate 
characteristics than noncorporate characteristics." It would appear that the most rea-
sonable interpretation of the reference to "paragraph (a)" in paragraph (h) is that 
with respect to incorporated professional service organizations the general resemblance 
test of paragraph (a)(l) applies, but with respect to unincorporated professional ser-
vice organizations, the specific "more corporate characteristics than non-corporate 
characteristics" test of paragraph (a)(3) also applies. The principal case purports to 
be applying the general resemblance test to Drexler and Wald, which was incorpo-
rated, but since the court relies on the presence or absence of the various character• 
istics to determine the resemblance, it is difficult to tell whether they are not confus-
ing the two tests and requiring more corporate characteristics than noncorporate 
characteristics in addition to resemblance. See principal case at 854. 
8. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(l) (1960). 
9. Id. 
IO. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1960). 
11. Id. § 301.7701·2(h)(l) (1965). 
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continue to share in the profits after termination of his employment, 
the regulations provide that there is no "continuity of life."12 The 
Drexler and Wald stockholders were required to dispose of their 
shares if they ceased to be actively employed by the company. More-
over, shares could only be transferred to the company or to indi-
vidual employees of the company, sales to outsiders being permis-
sible only if such people subsequently enter an employment 
relationship with the company.13 Consequently, the company could 
not meet the "continuity of life" test of the regulations. In addition, 
the regulations provide that when an ownership interest in a profes-
sional service organization is dependent upon the maintenance of 
an employment relationship, "if a member . . . may transfer his 
interest to a qualified person who is not a member of the organi-
zation only after having first offered his interest to other members 
of the organization at its fair market value, the corporate charac-
teristic of free transferability of interests does not exist.''14 The 
company's articles of incorporation provided that the sale of a share-
holder's interest was subject to the right of first refusal of the other 
shareholders.15 Thus, Drexler and Wald also did not satisfy the 
criterion of "free transferability of interests.'' 
With respect to a third corporate characteristic, the regulations 
provide that a professional service organization has "centralized 
management" when the "managers" have continuing exclusive 
authority to deal with a list of matters enumerated in the regula-
tions.16 The court apparently found that Drexler and Wald met 
12. Id. § 301.7701-2(11)(2) (1965). 
13. Drexler and Wald's articles of incorporation adopted §§ I(D) & (E) of rule 265 
of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. See text of these sections quoted in note 2 
supra. While article twenty-three of the corporation's articles of incorporation pro-
vided for the free transferability of a shareholder's interest to any licensed attorney, 
the shareholders added a stock redemption agreement requiring that the other share-
holders be given ten days notice and an opportunity to purchase the stock at the 
price an outsider was willing to pay. 
14-. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(5)(ii) (1965). 
15. See reference to article twenty-three of the corporation's articles of incorpo-
ration in note 13 supra. 
16. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(3) (1965) states that: 
In applying the rules of paragraph (c) of this section, relating to centralized 
management a professional service organization does not have centralization of 
management where the managers of a professional service organization under local 
law arc not vested with the continuing exclusive authority to determine any one 
or more of the following matters: (i) The hiring and firing of professional mem-
bers • • • and its professional and lay employees, (ii) the compensation of the 
members and of such employees, (iii) the conditions of employment-such as 
working hours, vacation periods, and sick leave, (iv) the persons who will be 
accepted as clients or patients, (v) who will handle each individual case or matter, 
(vi) the professional policies and procedures to be followed in handling each indi-
vidual case, (vii) the fees to be charged by the organization, (viii) the nature of 
the records to be kept, their use, and their disposition, and (ix) the times and 
amounts of distributions of earnings of the organization to its members as such. 
Moreover, although a measure of central control may exist in a professional ser-
vice organization, the managers of a professional service organization in which a 
member retains traditional professional responsibility cannot have the continuing 
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this requirement.17 However, the regulations provide further that 
if each member of a professional service organization retains his 
"traditional professional responsibility," the organization cannot be 
said to have "centralized management," regardless of the amount 
of authority vested in the board of managers.18 This second limita-
tion is not particularly helpful, since the regulations neglect to de-
fine "traditional professional responsibility." Each Drexler and Wald 
attorney retained a form of "professional responsibility" in accord-
ance with rule 265 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
not only prohibits practices by the corporation or by the individual 
attorneys that would be inconsistent with the local standards of pro-
fessional conduct, but also imposes personal responsibility upon an 
attorney who attempts to use the organization to shield his own 
unethical acts or omissions.19 If this is the kind of "traditional pro-
fessional responsibility" contemplated by the regulations,20 it is 
doubtful whether Drexler and Wald could satisfy the test of "cen-
tralized management." 
Drexler and Wald did seem to possess the fourth major corporate 
attribute. If members of an organization are not personally liable 
for the debts of or claims against the organization, it is said to have 
the corporate characteristic of "limited liability."21 Drexler and 
exclusive authority to determine all of the matters described in the preceding sen-
tence (Emphasis added.) 
To the requirements of paragraph (h), paragraph (c) adds, among others, the require-
ment that the management must be a group of persons which does not include all 
of the shareholders. 
17. It is doubtful whether the board of managers was solely responsible for decid-
ing "who will handle each individual case or matter" or "the professional policies and 
procedures to be followed in handling each individual case." But these are subjects 
which are typically decided by the individual employees in any corporation, and it 
seems unreasonable if the retention of only these prerogatives by the employees would 
prevent a professional service organization from having the characteristic of "cen-
tralized management." 
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(3) (1965) (quoted in note 16 supra). 
19. Furthermore, the rule does not purport "to modify the attorney client privilege 
[or] any comparable common law privilege." CoLO. R. Crv. P. 265, §§ II (B), (C), &: 
(D) (quoted in note 2 supra). 
20. If "traditional professional responsibility" does mean the ethical responsibility 
normally associated with members of the legal profession, it would appear that this 
criterion bears very little relation to "centralized management." It would be unusual 
if the fact that lawyers continued to be responsible for their personal acts of mis• 
conduct were held to preclude the existence of the "centralized management" charac-
teristic. 
21. Treas. Reg. § 30I.7701-2(d)(l) (1960), to which Treas. Reg. § 301.770I-2(h)(4) 
(1965) refers for the test of limited liability, defines personal liability as follows: 
"Personal liability means that a creditor of an organization may seek personal satis-
faction from a member of the organization to the extent that the assets of the organi-
zation are insufficient to satisfy a creditor's claim." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(4) 
(1965), however, provides the additional requirement that "the personal liability of 
its members, in their capacity as members of the organization, (be] no greater in any 
aspect than that of shareholders of an ordinary business corporation." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Wald was incorporated under the general corporation law of Colo-
rado, which provides that no shareholder will be personally liable 
for corporate debts.22 However, rule 265 of the Colorado Rules of 
Civil Procedure superimposes personal liability on members of pro-
fessional service corporations unless liability insurance of specified 
amounts is maintained.23 Since the company had the required insur-
ance coverage at all times, the individual lawyers were not in fact 
personally liable. Nevertheless, the government argued that the 
mvners of Drexler and Wald did not have the necessary limited lia-
bility because the statutory requirement of liability insurance was 
a precondition to their immunity.24 There were apparently two 
grounds for this argument. First, the personal liability of the mem-
bers could be said to have failed the test laid down by the regula-
tions of being "no greater in any aspect than that of shareholders 
of an ordinary business corporation."25 It should be noted, however, 
that the requirement of insurance is comparable to the insurance 
requirements or minimum asset restrictions which local law typically 
places on many kinds of ordinary corporations such as banks and 
insurance companies.26 Second, there would always be the possi-
bility that a future failure to insure would render the shareholders 
personally liable. This seems beside the point, however, since Drex-
ler and Wald's shareholders were, as the regulations require, not in 
fact personally liable.27 
Thus, the court's conclusion was based on a somewhat casual 
application of the Kintner regulations' criteria.28 Indeed, it may 
even be reasonable to infer that since Drexler and Wald lacks at 
least two, and probably three, of the relevant characteristics, it more 
nearly resembles a partnership than a corporation. Even assuming 
the court's decision to be incorrect on this issue, however, the ques-
22. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31--4-20 (1963). 
23. CoLO. R. CIV. P. 265, § I(G) (quoted in note 2 supra). Article six of Drexler 
and Wald's articles of incorporation provided for personal liability if the company 
failed to carry the requisite insurance. 
24. Brief for the United States in the principal case at 44-45. 
25. Treas. Reg. § 30I.7701-2(h)(4) (1965). 
26. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAw § 95 (McKinney 1957). 
27. It might also be maintained that members of the organization lack limited 
liability because each retained his personal liability to a client. See COLO. R. CIV. P. 
265, § Il(C) (quoted in note 1 supra). It should be noted, however, that such liability 
would arise only from a shareholder-attorney's acts and omissions, just as it would 
for an employee who was not an owner; such liability has nothing to do with his 
capacity as a member of the organization, and is not at all the same as the mutual 
agency relationship between partners and a partnership. See O'Neill v. United States, 
68 A.F.T.R.2d 405 (1968), which held that personal liability for an employee's own 
acts did not preclude his limited liability as a shareholder. 
28. The court discussed the major characteristics seriatim and apparently con-
cluded that Drexler and Wald satisfied all of them. Principal case at 854. In applying 
the tests of the regulations, however, the court appears to have ignored the stricter 
standards in paragraph (h), which wonld have disqualified Drexler and Wald on at 
least two of the characteristics. See notes 12-27 supra and accompanying text. 
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tion remains whether the Kintner regulations, which stipulate that 
certain organizations are to be taxed as partnerships regardless of 
incorporation under state law, are themselves valid. 
The court in the principal case reached its conclusion that the 
regulations are invalid by a process of seemingly incontestable syl-
logistic reasoning. For tax purposes an organization which carries 
on business for profit can only be either a partnership or a corpo-
ration.29 The Internal Revenue Code (Code) defines "partnership" 
as including "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unin-
corporated organization .... "30 Since the language refers to "other 
unincorporated" organizations, and since all of the forms of organi-
zation specifically enumerated are in fact unincorporated, the most 
reasonable interpretation of the statutory definition is that it is 
intended to exclude incorporated organizations from the category 
of partnerships.31 Therefore, since an incorporated organization 
cannot be a "partnership," and since for tax purposes a business 
organization is either a partnership or a corporation, all incorpo-
rated organizations must be corporations within the meaning of the 
Code. Having progressed this far, the court concluded that the 
Kintner regulations, which purport to classify some incorporated 
professional service organizations as "partnerships,"32 are inconsis-
tent with the Code, and, as such, are invalid. 
If the court's reasoning is correct, however, any organization 
incorporated under state law would be a corporation for federal tax 
purposes, regardless of its lack of corporate characteristics. An argu-
ment can be made that the presence or absence of corporate char-
acteristics should be a matter of indifference to those charged with 
enforcement of the federal tax laws and that incorporation under 
state law should be dispositive of the question of tax status, but 
such a result seems to be undesirable as a matter of tax policy. In 
bestowing certain tax benefits, Congress has chosen to differentiate 
between corporations and their employees on the one hand and 
partners and self-employed persons on the other.33 It would be un-
fortunate if states could undermine congressional policy and provide 
tax avoidance havens simply by donating the label of "corporation" 
to an organization which exhibits nearly all of the characteristics 
of an ordinary partnership. 
29. Of course, a business may be operated as a sole proprietorship. When it does, 
however, the sole proprietor is truced as an individual, under the theory of § 61 of 
the 1954 Code. 
30. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 7707(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
31. This analysis is supported by the general rule of statutory construction: ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius. It can perhaps be argued, however, that the lan-
guage should not be interpreted to exclude incorporated organizations, and that the 
enumeration is intended to be language of inclusion only and not limitation. 
32. Treas. Reg. § 30I.7701-2(h)(I) (1965). See also id. § 301.7701-l{c) (1960). 
33. See note 4 supra. 
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Furthermore, approaching the question from the opposite direc-
tion, if, as the Kintner regulations suggest, some incorporated orga-
nizations were not intended to be corporations within the meaning 
of the Code, then the court's major premise that for tax purposes an 
organization can only be either a corporation or a partnership would 
require that these organizations be categorized as "partnerships." 
This analysis suggests that the court's interpretation of the "partner-
ship" definitional section as excluding incorporated organizations 
may have been incorrect.34 Clearly, unless there is a gap in the Code, 
incorporated professional service organizations which more nearly 
resemble partnerships than corporations must fall into one category 
or the other. As was suggested above, policy may dictate inclusion 
of these organizations in the partnership category. But, the language 
of the "partnership" definitional section of the Code appears to the 
contrary. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the scope of the "corpo-
ration" definitional section.35 
The first pertinent legislation creating separate tax treatment 
for corporations was the Revenue Act of 1894, which provided cor-
porate tax treatment for associations and for corporations "no mat-
ter how created and organized, but not including partnerships."36 
The Revenue Act of 1909, using substantially the same language, 
again provided corporate tax treatment for associations and for cor-
porations "organized of any state."37 Thus, while it was within Con-
gress' power to do otherwise,38 it chose to tax organizations incorpo-
rated under state law as corporations.39 The Revenue Act of 1918 
34. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. 
35. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 770l(a)(3): 
Corporation.-Term "corporation" includes associations, joint-stock companies, 
and insurance companies. 
36. Rev. Act of 1894, cb. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (emphasis added). It would appear 
that Congress intended a broad scope for the term "corporation,'' having left it to 
be read in pari materia with "association" and other similar terms. See Scallen, supra 
note 6, at 611-13. 
37. Rev. Act of 1909, cb. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (emphasis added). 
38. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) ("State law creates legal interests 
but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be taxed."); Wholesalers 
Adjustment Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1937) (local law irrelevant to 
federal tax treatment and classification since to permit otherwise would destroy uni-
formity of tax treatment among the states). 
39. This conclusion follows if one assumes that "organized,'' as used, means incor-
porated. The Rev. Act of 1913, cb. 16, § 2G(a), 38 Stat. 172, and the Rev. Act of 
1916, ch. 463, § l(a), 39 Stat. 756-57, by using language substantially similar to that 
of the preceding acts, would seem to have adopted the earlier conception of the term 
"corporation." That is, Congress intended to define "corporation" broadly to include 
"associations" and various other organizations not generally recognized as corporations. 
In fact, Congress' intention to tax state chartered corporations as sucb was never 
doubted until the promulgation of the 1960 Kintner regulations. Anderson, Tax As-
pects of Professional Corporations, S. CAL. 15TH TAX INST. 309, 320-22 (1963); Eaton, 
Professional Associations as Planning Techniques, N.Y.U. 25TH INST. ON FED. TAX 671, 
673-74 (1966); Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HARV. L. REv. 756, 
785 (1962). See also Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943); 
Burnet v. Commonwealth Improv. Co., 287 U.S. 415, 419 (1932). 
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retained virtually the same language, but, in addition, it specifically 
denied corporate tax status to "personal service corporations and 
associations," including those comprised of doctors or lawyers, stat-
ing that these organizations were to be taxed as ordinary partner-
ships.40 However, the Revenue Act of 1921 repealed thi!i special 
treatment of personal service corporations and associations, appar-
ently manifesting a congressional intent not to use different standards 
for determining the tax status of these organizations.41 Since 1921, 
succeeding revenue acts have used substantially the same language 
to distinguish between organizations entitled to tax treatment as 
corporations and those to be taxed as partnerships, without again 
adopting special rules for the treatment of personal service corpo-
rations. 42 Therefore, one must assume that Congress has intended 
not to change its 1921 policy of determining the tax status of ordi-
nary corporations and personal service organizations according to 
the same standards. 43 
From the earliest Treasury regulations to go beyond a mere re-
statement of the statutory language in 1913 until the Kintner regu-
lations in 1960, the statutory terms "corporation" and "association" 
have been construed broadly to embrace even some unincorporated 
organizations with few corporate characteristics.44 Throughout this 
same period, Congress re-enacted statutes at least eleven times with-
out significantly altering the language used to define corporations 
and partnerships,45 and the regulations interpreting these statutes 
were sustained by the courts.46 When the interpretations of a statu-
40. Rev. Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 218(e), 40 Stat. 1070 (1919). 
41. Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 218(d), 42 Stat. 245 (1921). The repeal of the 
special treatment provision for personal service organizations, like its enactment, arose 
in the Senate Finance Committee, and was passed with little or no debate. Repeal 
may have been motivated by doubts as to the constitutionality of the discriminatory 
treatment of such organizations by the Revenue Act of 1918. Scallen, supra note 6, 
at 617-18. 
42. Scallen, supra note 6, at 556-66. Section 770l(a) of the 1954 Code uses substan-
tially the same form of definition for the terms "corporation" and "partnership" as 
was used in §§ 3797(a)(2) & (3) of the 1939 Code. 
43. Although changes in the tax law have given corporations and their owners 
more favorable treatment than they had received in the past (see note 4 supra), these 
changes alone cannot be said to be indicative of a congressional intent to restrict 
the scope of the previously adopted definition of "corporation"; for, if one were to 
conclude otherwise, one would be suggesting that every time Congress altered the tax 
treatment of a previously defined item, the definition, as Congress understood it, 
would also be altered. 
44. See Treas. Reg. 33, art. 62 (1918); Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506 (1921); Treas. Reg. 
65, arts. 1503 & 1506 (1924); Treas. Reg. 74, arts. 1313 & 1516 (1929); Treas. Reg. 77, 
arts. 1312 & 1316 (1933); Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-5 (1935). Compare Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.7701-2 (1965). Other regulations provided that the new statutes were to be inter-
preted in substantially the same manner as in earlier regulations and, in some cases, 
even broadened the meaning of "corporation." Scallen, supra note 6, at 655-66. 
45. Rev. Acts of 1913, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1921, 1924, 1932, 1936, and 1938 and the 
!NT. REv. CODES OF 1939 -and 1954. See notes 36-42 supra and accompanying text. 
46. E.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Pelton v. Commissioner, 
82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936). 
February 1968] Recent Developments 789 
tory provision by the courts and by the regulations-is substantially 
uniform over a period of years, and Congress repeatedly re-enacts 
the provision without material changes, the doctrine of congres-
sional adoption is sometimes invoked to incorporate, in effect, the 
previous administrative and judicial interpretations into the statute. 
Such interpretations acquire the force of law and, like any law, are 
amenable to change by Congress but not by the courts or by subse-
quent Treasury regulations.47 Thus, there is strong justification for 
applying the "congressional adoption" doctrine to the administrative 
interpretation of "corporation" contained in the pre-Kintner regu-
lations and for making that interpretation immune to amendment 
by subsequent regulations. 
Without challenging the "congressional adoption" doctrine, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has apparently taken the position 
that the doctrine is inapplicable to the problem of determining the 
tax status of professional service organizations. Its argument is that 
subsequent regulations alone are sufficient to modify previous inter-
pretations of the statute because neither the regulations prior to 
the 1954 Code nor those promulgated immediately afterward dealt 
specifically with "professional service organizations."48 While this 
argument might be persuasive if the Kintner regulations were merely 
an explanation of how to apply the historical tests to professional 
service organizations, in fact these regulations completely reject 
prior standards used to define ordinary corporations. Thus, it would 
seem immaterial that the prior regulations did not specifically con-
sider professional service organizations, especially in light of the 
apparent congressional intent not to distinguish between the stan-
dards for determining the tax status of such organizations and that 
of ordinary corporations.49 
47. In Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 283 (1966), which 
held an attempted change in regulations invalid, the Court said: 
Over the same extended period of years during which the foregoing adminis-
trative and judicial precedent was accumulated, Congress repeatedly re-enacted 
the depreciation provision without siguificant change. Thus beyond the generally 
understood depreciation provision itself, the Commissioner's prior long-standing 
and consistent administrative practice must be deemed to have received congres-
sional approval. 
See also Commarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1959); United States v. 
Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1956); Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 
469 (1946); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938). For critical comment on the 
"congressional adoption" doctrine, see Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Prob-
lem, 54 HARV. L. REv. 398 (1941); Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regula-
tions Under Income, &tate and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 556, 559-61 (1940). 
48. Brief for the United States in the principal case at 55. It is interesting to note, 
however, that in 1936 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) successfully maintained that 
such organizations were subject to the same rules as other organizations. Pelton v. 
Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936). Also militating against this argument is the 
1921 Act's abolition of the brief statutory recoguition of special treatment accorded 
such organizations. See notes 40 &: 41 supra and accompanying text. A prior argument 
as to the inapplicability of the doctrine, under somewhat similar circumstances in-
volving depreciation, was summarily rejected by the Court. Fribourg Navigation Co. v. 
Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 283 (1966). 
49. See notes 40 &: 41 supra and accompanying text. With the Kintner regulations, 
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The Kintner regulations are inconsistent not only with previous 
regulations, but also with judicial interpretations of the "corpora-
tion" definitional section of the Code-section 770l(a)(3) of the 
1954 Code and its predecessors. For example, in Pelton v. Commis-
sioner, 50 in 1936, the IRS successfully maintained that an association 
of three doctors who carried on their medical practice through a 
trust arrangement was taxable as a corporation. It seems clear, how-
ever, that this association could not qualify as a corporation under 
the Kintner regulations, since it more nearly resembled a trust than 
a corporation.51 Moreover, Morrissey v. Commissioner,52 the very 
case upon which the Kintner regulations are purportedly based,53 
seems to indicate that the treatment accorded professional organi-
zations by the regulations is not justified. In Morrissey the Supreme 
Court noted that "[t]he inclusion of associations with corporations 
implies resemblance, but it is resemblance and not identity. The 
resemblance points to features distinguishing associations from part· 
nerships .... " 54 The Kintner regulations purport to follow such a 
test of resemblance, 55 but, as a practical matter, they create a for-
midable barrier to a determination that a professional service orga-
nization is a corporation. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the 
all-or-nothing standard which the regulations apply to determine the 
presence or absence of the major corporate attributes in a public 
service corporation. For example, an organization does not possess 
especially the 1965 revised Kintner regulations, the Commissioner has attempted uni• 
laterally to reverse this "presumptively corporate" treatment and in effect has adminis• 
tratively legislated that virtually all professional service organizations are partnerships 
for federal tax purposes. This not only abandons the IRS's long-standing practice 
of extending corporate tax status to as many unincorporated organizations as pos• 
sible, but also attempts to classify as partnerships a large group of businesses which 
are corporations under state law. 
50. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936). 
51. See Treas. Reg. § 301.770l(a)(l) (1960); Scallen, supra note 6, at 625-48. See 
also United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) (association of doctors held 
to be a "corporation''); Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964) 
(association of doctors held to be a corporation in spite of the 1960 Kintner regula• 
tions); Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959), appeal dismissed, 257 
F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1960) (association of doctors held to be "corporation" on the eve 
of the 1960 Kintner regulations). 
52. 296 U.S. 344 (1935). 
53. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(l) (1960). See also id. § 301.7701-l(c) (1960). 
54. 296 U.S. at 357. The resemblance test has been articulated as follows: 
Where an entity of this kind resembles a corporation in some respects and that 
of a partnership in others-that frequently being the case-the features of simi-
larity should be compared and the marks of dissimilarity contrasted. The resem-
blances should be balanced. It should be determined by that method the one to 
which the enterprise is predominantly akin in the method, mode, and form of 
procedure of the conduct of its business. 
Commissioner v. Brouillard, 70 F.2d 154, 158 (10th Cir. 1934). It should be noted that 
some characteristics of resemblance might well be disregarded under certain circum-
stances. See note IO supra and accompanying text. 
55. Treas. Reg. § 30I.7701-2(a)(l) (1960). 
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"limited liability" when the liability of its members "in any aspect" 
rises above that of a shareholder-employee of an ordinary business 
corporation.56 Similarly, there is no "centralized management" if 
any one of several indicia of control is absent or if an owner-
employee retains "traditional professional responsibility" regardless 
of the extent to which the management is in fact centralized.57 Fur-
thermore, if the organization has a right of first refusal when a share-
holder attempts to sell him stock, and if the benefits from ownership 
of stock are inseparable from the employment relationship, there 
is no free transferability of interests,58 even though the interests are 
otherwise freely transferable. Finally, also because the benefits of 
ownership are dependent upon employment, the organization tech-
nically would lack "continuity of life,"59 irrespective of the actual 
extent to which the organization could endure the departure of one 
or more of its members.6° Consequently, the cumulative effect of 
the Kintner regulations could produce distorted results to the ex-
tent that the mere presence or absence of these corporate attributes 
determines the characterization of the organization for federal tax 
purposes. 61 
56. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701·2(h)(4) (1965). See note 21 supra and accompanying text. 
57. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(3) (1965). See notes 16 & 20 supra and accompanying 
text. It should be noted that the disqualification for retention of traditional profes-
sional responsibility is either somewhat at odds with the IRS's position that retention 
of professional responsibility is inherent in, and not inconsistent with, the employ-
ment of a professional, or it signifies that the IRS feels that professional service 
organizations can never have centralized management. Compare Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-
2(h)(!I) (1965), with Cody v. Ribicoff, 289 F.2d 394, 398 (8th Cir. 1961), and Flemming 
v. Hucke, 284 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 1960), and Walker v. Attmeyer, 137 F.2d 531, 
5!1!1 (2d Cir. 1943), and Wendell E. James, 25 T.C. 1296, 1301 (1956), and Rev. Rul. 
61-178, 1961-2 CUM, BULL. 153. 
58. Treas, Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(5) (1965). Although paragraph (e)(2) recognizes a 
modified form of free transferability where sale of stock is subject to the company's 
rights of first refusal, paragraph (h), for no apparent reason, rejects this concept in 
the context of professional service organizations. One should note also that there is 
an apparent conflict between the requirements of "centralized management," which 
specify that the managers must have complete control over hiring and firing of 
employees and the requirement of "free transferability of interests," which specifies 
that employment must be "transferable" without consent, where benefits are depen-
dent upon employment. Compare Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(3) (1965), with id. 
§ 301.7701-2(h)(5) (1965). 
59. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(2) (1965). This corporate characteristic was not 
specified in the Morrissey decision, upon which the regulations are purportedly based. 
60. Id. § 301.7701-2(h)(2) (1965). 
61. Further evidence of the adverse impact of the Kintner regulations is the fact 
that closely held corporations, which uniformly have been treated as "corporations" 
for federal tax purposes, perhaps would not be classified as corporations if the rigid 
standards of corporateness of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965) were applied. Consider 
the not atypical example of a closely held corporation managed by two men, each of 
whom owns fifty per cent of the stock. Assume that the stock is subject to a transfer 
restriction which prohibits transfer of ownership without the consent of the other 
shareholder and which provides that the corporation will purchase at a given .price 
the stock of a shareholder desiring to sell. Obviously, there would not be "free trans-
ferability of interests," Furthermore, the transfer restrictions coupled with the buy-
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Courts have considered four factors in determining the proper 
weight to accord a Treasury regulation when its validity is in issue: 
(I) whether the regulation is "legislative" or merely "interpreta-
tive";62 (2) if it is interpretative, whether the regulation and the 
statute were contemporaneous;63 (3) the length of time since the 
regulation was first promulgated; and (4) whether the regulation 
has withstood re-enactments of the Code.64 Since the Kintner regu-
lations are interpretative, were drafted long after the drafting of 
the relevant section of the 1954 Code,65 and are not of long standing, 
and since there has been no re-enactment of that Code section since 
the Kintner regulations were promulgated, it is submitted that the 
regulations should be accorded a very slight presumption of validity. 
The analysis that has been followed throughout this Note would 
suggest that at this point only Congress, and not the IRS, can change 
the historical practice of treating organizations that are incorporated 
under state law as corporations for federal tax purposes.66 If, as was 
suggested above, 67 it is undesirable as a matter of federal tax policy 
back agreement probably prevent the organization from having "continuity of life," 
since the dissatisfaction of either owner would seriously impair the capital of the cor-
poration and/or cause dissolution, either from the impairment of the capital or from 
the impasse between the two shareholders on key decisions. If this corporation is 
organized or does business in a state whose laws provide that the shareholders, or 
the officers or directors are liable personally for wages of employees, or if the owners 
run the business so informally and directly as to subject themselves to personal lia-
bility through the "alter ego" concept of "piercing the corporate veil," there would 
be no "limited liability." In addition, it is very often the case with closely held cor-
porations that outsiders will not do business with the corporation unless the share-
holders personally guarantee the corporate debts. Such guarantees would preclude any 
traditional notion of limited liability. See note 21 supra. Furthermore, "centralized 
management" might well be lacking under Treas. Reg. § 301.770I-2(h)(3) (1965), 
because decisions about the compensation, hiring, and working conditions of each 
employee might not be subject to the "exclusive authority" of the management, or, 
even if it were, because all members (shareholders) might constitute managers. See 
Treas. Reg. § 30l.7701-2(c) (1960); note 16 supra. Thus, it is conceivable that such an 
organization, or even one which more closely resembled an ordinary corporation, 
could fail to meet the resemblance test of the Kintner regulations. 
62. A regulation is "legislative" when it is promulgated pursuant to specific statu-
tory direction to fill in the details of a statute [e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 472(a)], 
whereas it is "interpretative" when promulgated under the general grant of power 
to interpret the Code. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7805. Of course, legislative regula-
tions are accorded much more judicial deference than interpretative regulations. 
63. If the regulation were drafted contemporaneously with the statute, the inter-
pretation is accorded a high presumption of validity since the same staff of Treasury 
attorneys who draft the regulations also work with Congress in drafting the statute 
and thus "knew" the intent of Congress. 
64. See B. BITTKER & E. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS 38 (2d ed. 1966); Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Asso-
ciations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REv. 603, 648-49 (1965). 
65. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 770I(a). The section was drafted-prior to 1954, whereas 
the Kintner regulations, which appeared in 1960 and were revised in 1965, were 
drafted in 1959 and 1964, respectively. 
66. See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text. 
67. See note 28 supra and following text. 
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to allow states to make various corporate tax benefits available to 
their partnerships simply by designating them as "corporations" _or 
"associations," Congress can foreclose this opportunity by amending 
the Code or by explicitly authorizing the Treasury Department to 
promulgate appropriate regulations.68 But, even if regulations pro-
mulgated without congressional authorization could reverse the tra-
ditional practice of taxing incorporated organizations as corporations, 
there is no basis for distinguishing in this respect between profes-
sional service organizations and any other form of business organi- 1 
zation. In other words, even if subsections (a) through (g) of the 
Kintner regulations, which lay out the general resemblance test 
applicable to all corporations, are found to be legitimate adminis-
trative interpretations of the Code, subsection (h), which provides 
burdensome handicaps for professional service organizations in their 
attempts to qualify for corporate tax treatment, would appear to be 
discriminatory in a way not justified by the statute and therefore 
invalid.0° Finally, assuming, arguendo, that subsections (a) through 
(g) are valid in principle, the standards embodied in those sub-
sections should be applied in a more flexible and objective manner, 
and the resemblance test patterned after the Morrissey case should 
be accepted for what it is-a test calling for similarity rather than 
virtual identity.70 Whether an organization is a corporation for tax 
purposes is a question of fact; each of the so-called "major charac-
teristics" is relevant to this determination, but the decision should 
not be based on a wooden application of intractable rules. 
68. If Congress were to authorize the Treasury Department to promulgate regula-
tions, such rules would be legislative rather than merely interpretative and would thus 
be entitled to a higher presumption of validity than the current Kintner regulations. 
See note 62 supra. One could argue that since a congressional authorization can shroud 
subsequent regulations with validity, congressional silence in the face of an "unau-
thorized" or "interpretative" regulation is tantamount to acceptance and such regula-
tions, after a while, also acquire the presumption of validity. 
69. See O'Neill v. United States, 68 A.F.T.R.2d 405 (1968), holding that paragraphs 
(a) through (g) are valid while paragraph (h) is invalid. 
70. On the desirability of a flexible application of the resemblance test, the court in 
Morrissey stated: 
These definitions while helpful, are not to be pressed so far as to make mere 
formal procedure a controlling test. The provision itself negatives such a construc-
tion ••• it is impossible in the nature of things to translate the statutory concept 
of "association" into particularity of detail that would fix the status of every sort of 
enterprise or organization which ingenuity may create. 
296 U.S. 344, 358 (1935). 
